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The development of the doctrine known as "tender of defense"
rests upon the axiom "that it is for the interests of the community
that a limit should be opposed to the continuance of litigation, and
that the same cause of action should not be brought twice to a
final determination."'
A generally accepted statement of the doctrine is that found in
2
the case of Littleton v. Richardson:
"When a person is responsible over to another, either
by operation of law or by express contract ...and he is duly
notified of the pendency of the suit and requested to take upon
him the defense of it, he is no longer regarded as a stranger,
because he has the right to appear and defend the action, and
has the same means and advantages of controverting the claim
as if he was the real and nominal party upon the record. In
every such case, if due notice is given to such person, the
judgment, if obtained without fraud or collusion . . . will be
conclusive against him, whether he has appeared or not."
In some states the matter is covered by statute, ordinarily merely
3
a statement of the common law.
The designation of the procedure as a tender of defense is not
4
strictly accurate since it is available to a plaintiff in some cases,
but the nature of the fact situations under which a right to indemnity
arises is such that the doctrine is more generally applied by an individual who has been sued. The procedure has also been termed
"vouching in", an expression which originated in connection with
notifying a warrantor of title to appear and defend an attack upon
I Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wallace 657, 672; 71 U.S. 657, 18 L.Ed. 427 (1866).
234 N.H. 179, 187; 66 Am. Dec. 759 (1856).

3Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition Sec. 447, Vol. 1, p. 979, citing Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Union Warehouse & Compress Co., 139 Ga. 20, 76

S.E. 360 (1912); Western Surety Co. v. Kelley, 27 S.D. 465, 131 N.W. 803

(1911), and Ashburn v. Watson, 8 Ga. App. 566, 70 S.E. 19 (1911).
4For example, when one to whom title is warranted begins an action for
eviction against a claimant of title in possession and seeks to conclude the
warrantor of title by serving upon him notice of the action of eviction and
an opportunity to defend. Wolfe v. Barataria Land Co., 255 Fed. 503 (C.C.A.
8th. 1919). See also Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Sec. 448, Vol. 1,

p. 983.
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the title, 5 and the individual to whom such notice is given is called
6
the "vouchee", the person giving the notice being the "voucher".
The purpose of this article is not to present an exhaustive collection of the case material on this doctrine, but to point up for the
practicing attorney some of the situations in which the doctrine is
applicable, the extent of its function, and the requisites for an effective tender of defense. Because of the great disparity in the cases
on the question of what is required for an effective tender, it is considered worth while to discuss the heretofore neglected question of
Conflict of Laws in connection therewith.
FIELDS IN WHICH DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE

The doctrine is applicable in cases where a party to a suit has
a right to indemnity, either by operation of law or by express contract.7

Some of the fields in which a tender of defense has been

made are as follows: liability insurance, as where a defendant-insured
tenders defense of a suit by the injured claimant to the insurer;'
covenants and warranties, as where a vendee defending his right to
title tenders the defense to his vendor-warrantor ;g and suits by parties
to commercial paper, as where an endorsee of a note brings an action
against the maker to which the defense of usury is interposed and
the endorsee vouches in his endorser. 10
A right to indemnity between tort feasors exists when tort feasors
are not as between themselves in pari delicto.'1 Defense of an action
5 140

A.L.R. 1121 citing 15 R.C.L. 1020, Judgments Sec. 492.
The words indemnitee and indemnitor will be used generally in this article to
describe the individual who has a right over, and the person against whom
such right is had.
7 Cases in which the indemnitor agrees to indemnify against the results of
litigation to which he is not a party are not within the scope of this article.
8 140 A.L.R. 1121, citing Miller v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co., 291
Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935), and Edinger & Co. v. Southwestern Surety
Ins. Co., 182 Ky. 340, 206 S.W. 465 (1918).
9 140 A.L.R. 1122, citing Fitzpatrick v. Hoffman, 104 Mich. 228, 62 N.W. 349
(1895), and Knapp v. Marlboro, 34 Vt. 235. See also Wolfe v. Barataria Land
Co., supra, note 4.
10 Drennan v. Bunn, 124 Ill. 175, 16 N.E. 100, 7 Am. St. Rep. 354 (1888). See 34
A.L.R. 157, Hagertley v. Bradford, 9 Ala. 567 (1846). (In this situation it is
the plaintiff who avails himself of the doctrine.)
1 Where the person seeking indemnity is concurrently negligent, no right to
indemnity arises because no contract for contribution or indemnity can be
implied between wrong doers, since an implied promise rests upon equitable
grounds. 9 Cyc. 805. See Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 25, S.Ct. 226, 49 L.Ed. 453 (1905). The exception
to the rule is that where one tort feasor has been guilty of no actual wrong
and the other tort feasor has been the active participant in the tort, the former
may recover over against the active perpetrator. The basis of the exception
is that tort feasors are not as between themselves in pari delicto. Baltimore
& 0. R. Co. v. Howard County, 111 Md. 176. 73 Atl. 656, 40 L.R.A. (N.s.)
1172 (1909), Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. East Texas Public
Service Company, 48 Fed. (2nd) 23 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931). Cf. London Guaranty
and Accident Company v. Strait Scale Company, 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W. (2nd)
6
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may be tendered by a constructive tort feasor to one whose active negligence has caused the damage for which the constructive tort feasor
is being sued. 12 For example, a municipality sued for breach of its
duty to keep the streets free from defects may tender the defense
3
of the action to the person responsible for causing the defect.2
Freeman states that a third party cannot be called upon to defend
an action if the establishment of his freedom from liability will not
necessarily result in a judgment in favor of the party asking him
to defend. 14 That statement of the rule is not consistent with the cases
which hold that a tender of defense may be made by one tort feasor
to another, and the question of which of the tort feasors is primarily
liable may be litigated in a second suit' 5 in which the defendant
may show that the plaintiff was actively negligent.' Were the alleged
indemnitor in the second suit to accept the tender and show that
he was not liable, such showing would not necessarily result in a
judgment in favor of the voucher, and under the rule as stated by
Freeman, the tender of defense would not be valid.
Freeman cites as authority for the rule the case of Raleigh &
Gaston R. Co. v. Western & Atlantic R. Co." The facts in that case
are briefly as follows: the Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. contracted with
the Pullman Co. to make all necessary repairs on the latter's cars
damaged while in the possession of Raleigh, no matter from what
cause the damage occurred. The Western & Atlantic R. Co. damaged
a car belonging to Pullman while said car was in the possession of
Raleigh. In a suit by Pullman against Raleigh for breach of contract,
the latter tendered the defense to Western, which did not accept, and
Pullman recovered a judgment against Raleigh. Raleigh claimed that
the judgment against it was conclusive on Western. It was held that
the liability of Raleigh was independent of the liability of Western and
that before there can be a tender of defense, the action between the
injured party and the voucher must be such that the vouchee could set
up therein any defense which he could set up if the suit were proceeding against him directly. The facts did not require the court
766. 64 A.L.R. 936 (1929), in which a buyer of strait scales recovered over
against the seller for damages paid to an individual injured by reason of a
defect in the scale. Since recovery was based on breach of implied warranty
of fitness, it was held immaterial whether the buyer was an active tort feasor.

See also Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Sec. 93 and Sec. 94.

12 Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 32 F. (2d) 182 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1929), Washington Gas Light Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316,

16 S.Ct. 564, 40 L. Ed. 712 (1895).

13Robbins v. Chicago City, fn. 1, supra.
14 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Sec. 448, Vol. 1 p. 982.
' Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compana Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461,
31 N.E. 987, 30 Am. St. Rep. 685 (1892).
' Boston & M. R. Co. v. Sargent, 72 N.H. 455, 57 Atl. 688 (1904).

716 Ga. App. 616, 65 S.E. 586 (1909). See note.
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to go that far. On the facts, the case merely stands for the rule that
in order for a tender of defense to be effective, some of the issues
in the suit against the indemnitee must be such as will necessarily be
litigated in the suit against the indemnitor. In the Raleigh case it was
no part of Pullman's case to prove Western's negligence, and the
finding of fact as to the amount of damage could not be conclusive
on Western since it was no part of the plaintiff's case to show what
part of the damage was caused by Western.
If the rule as set forth by Freeman were to be more generally
applied, the doctrine of tender of defense would, from a practical
standpoint, be greatly limited in its application to tort cases involving
indemnity between constructive tort feasor and an active tort feasor
since there are few such cases in which it is clear that there is no
active negligence on the part of the constructive tort feasor.
FUNCTION OF DOCTRINE

8

Upon an effective tender of defense in a pending suit the party
to whom the defense is tendered is concluded by the judgment in
that suit on all the matters necessarily included in the adjudication. 9
Thus, for example where a constructive tort feasor vouches in the
active tort feasor whom he believes to be primarily responsible for
the injury, the judgment against the constructive tort feasor is conclusive that the injury occurred as the result of the negligent act
or negligent creation or maintenance of the condition alleged ;20 that
it was not caused either by the intervening act of a stranger 2 1 or by
the contributory negligence of the person injured, 22 and that the
damages suffered were those awarded by said judgment.23 In addition the indemnitor is estopped to deny that he was negligent where,
because he has direct control of the premises or condition, the negligence which the former action established was necessarily his negligence.2 4 The indemnitor is not only concluded on the issues actually
raised in the litigation, but he is also concluded as to any defenses
the original defendant might have employed.2 5 In the action for in-

demnity, however, the defendant may show that he is not under a
18 40 L.R.A. (N.s.)
29

1172. Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Sec. 450, Vol. 1,
p. 991.
Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, fn. 12, supra; Todd v.
Chicago, 18 Ill. App. 565 (1886).

20 Fn. 16, supra.

21 Byne v. Americus, 6 Ga. App. 48, 64 S.E. 285 (1909).
22 McNaughton v. Elkhardt, 86 Ind. 384.
23 Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Campania Transatlantica Espanola, fn. 15, supra.
24 Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, fn. 12, supra.
25 Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N.Y. 65 (1878).
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duty to indemnify.28 Thus, in a tort case, he may show the intervening
27
active negligence of the defendant in the first suit.
It should be noted that the indemnitee as well as the indemnitor
is concluded by the adjudication. The estoppel must be mutual. 2
29
In American Candy Company v. Aetna Life Insurance Company
it was stated that where the defense in an action is duly tendered to
one who may under any aspect of the case be liable over to the party
sued, and the person to whom the defense is tendered becomes thereby
in legal effect a party to the action and is bound by the judgment,
the estoppel of the judgment is mutual. In that case, a minor who was
employed in violation of the law, recovered a judgment against his
employer for an injury suffered during the course of employment.
The employer tendered the defense of the action to the insurance
company. In the action against the employer, it was found that
the minor was employed contrary to law. The policy exempted the
insurance company from liability for injury received by any person
employed in violation of the law. In the actioh by the employer against
the insurance company, it was held that the employer was concluded
by the judgment on the issue of whether the employee was employed
contrary to law.
A question may be raised as to whether the judgment is conclusive
upon the vouchee where the voucher fails to make a defense. In
Restatement of the Law of Judgments it is stated that if the indemnitor
has knowledge of the proceeding and has reasonable notice to defend,
the indemnitee is not bound to make a defense except where the
relation between them is such that the indemnitee has a duty to
protect the indemnitor's interests, as it may be in the case of principal
and agent. Thus, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the indemnitor
is concluded by the judgment against the indemnitee even if the
judgment is by default or although the indemnitee does not carefully
defend the action. 0 It has been held that the vouchee is concluded
by a judgment although the case is tried on agreed facts,3 1 and that
it is no objection to use of a judgment as a bar that the issues were
referred to the court though triable by a jury.2 2 The Restatement of
Inashima v. Wardall, 128 Wash. 617, 224 P. 379 (1924), later appeal in 145
Wash. 77, 258 P. 839 (1927).
27 See fn. 15 and 16, supra.
28 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Sec. 450, Vol. 1, p. 993; Restatement
of the Law of Judgments Sec. 107b.
29 164 Wis. 266, 159 N.W. 917 (1916).
30 Sec. 107 f.
31 First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. City Nat. Bank of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130,
65 N.E. 24, 94 Am. S.R. 637 (1902).
32 Prescott v. Le Conte, 83 App. Div. 482, 82 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1903), affirmed
per curiam 178 N.Y.S. 85, 70 N.E. 1108 (1904).
26
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the Law of Judgments3 3 indicates, however, that the vouchee is not
concluded by a judgment by confession.
It should be noted that where the vouchee is refused the right
to aid in the defense, he is not concluded by the judgment;34 and
it has been held that a vouchee is not bound by a judgment where he
offers a good defense which the voucher refuses to plead.35
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE TENDER OF DEFENSE

Requirements of the various courts for an effective tender of
defense range from the statement that the notice must be clear and
explicit with an offer to surrender control of the defense and an
expression of the consequences that will follow recovery by the
claimant3 6 to the statement that mere knowledge of the pendency of the
suit is sufficient to constitute a valid tender.37
All courts require the notice to be timely.38 The test of timeliness
is that the notice be given in sufficient time under the facts and
circumstances to afford to the vouchee an opportunity to attend the
trial and make a defense.3 9 A Wisconsin case indicates that a tender
should be made before the expiration of the time to answer.40
It is generally required that the notice and tender must be given
by the one seeking indemnity.41 In Burchett v. Blackburn42 it was
stated that since the notice for all practicable purposes takes the
place of judicial process, it should at least purport to emanate from
the one who seeks to benefit by it. In that case the covenantor
had knowledge of the suit, but no express notice from the covenantee,
and the court held the notice insufficient. The case of Lebanon v.
43
Meade held that notice from a disinterested party was insufficient.
An oral notice has generally been held sufficient, 44 although several
courts, including the Wisconsin court, uphold the rule with reluctance,
reasoning that a notice which takes the place of judicial process should
rest in higher proof. 45 The Michigan courts do not recognize an oral
48
tender of defense.
3 Sec. 107 f.
City of Lewiston v. Isaman, 19 Idaho 653, 115 Pac. 494 (1911).
City of Seattle v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 47 Wash. 552, 92 Pac. 411 (1907);
subsequent appeal. 62 Wash. 129, 114 Pac. 1038 (1911).
38 Hersey v. Long, 30 Minn. 114, 14 N.W. 508 (1883).
37 Robbins v. Chicago City, fn. 1, supra.
38A.L.R. 1440: Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612 (1875); Somers v. Schmidt, 24
Wis. 417 (1869).
3 Saveland v. Green, fn. 38, supra.
40 Somers v. Schmidt, fn. 38, supra.
41 Somers v. Schmidt, fn. 38, supra; see 123 A.L.R. 1153.
42 198 Ky. 304, 248 S.W. 853 (1923).
43 64 N.H. 8, 4 At. 392 (1885).
44 Cummings v. Harrison, 57 Miss. 275 (1879) ; Miner v. Clark, 15 Wend. 425
(New York, 1836).
45 Somers v. Schmidt, fn. 38, supra; Burchett v. Blackburn, fn. 42, supra.
46 Mason v. Kellog, 38 Mich. 132 (1878).
34
35
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The sufficiency of the notice may depend to some extent upon
the basis of the liability over.4 7 In Missouri P. R. Co. v. Twiss"
the court stated that especially where a party knows that the injury
was caused by himself and no one else, and that if a recovery is had,
it will be because of his neglect and wrong, requirements of notice
and tender are satisfied 'when he has knowledge of the pendency of
the suit and can defend it if he wishes, indicating that where there
is no doubt about the right to indemnity, the notice can be less express
49
.than where indemnity is debatable.
What the notice must contain is a matter on which there is
little agreement. Although the cases are in accord that there must be
an opportunity to defend,50 there is conflict as to what is required
to give that opportunity. The United States Supreme Couit, in
the leading case of Robbins v. Chicago City,51 recognized as a tender
of defense mere knowledge of the nature of a suit and the fact that
it was pending. A suit had been begun against the City of Chicago
for personal injury caused by a defect in the street in front of
Robbin's premises. Robbins was responsible for the defect. The
City was held liable to the person injured because of the breach
of its duty to keep the streets free from defects, and in the case
of Robbins v. Chicago City, Robbins was held responsible over to
the City, and it was held that he was concluded by the judgment against
the City. No written notice was given to Robbins of the pendency
of the suit, and he was not told that he could defend the action
against the City. He knew of the pendency of the suit because the
city attorney had applied to him to assist in procuring testimony. The
day of the trial or the day previous to it, the city attorney, casually
meeting Robbins at the foot of the stairway to the courthouse, remarked to him that the suit was coming on, but he did not tell him
in what court the suit was pending and he did not give him notice
that the City would look to him for indemnity. The city attorney
did not tell Robbins of the nature of his office, presuming that
Robbins knew that fact. The Supreme Court held that there was a
sufficient tender of defense, the legal presumption being that Robbins
knew he was answerable to the City and that it must also be presumed
that Robbins knew he had a right to defend the suit.
In marked contrast to the Robbins case' are the cases holding that
the notice must apprise the party whose rights are to be affected
A.L.R. 1443.
35 Neb. 267, 53 N.W. 76, 37 Am. St. Rep. 437 (1892).
o See dissenting opinion in Wolfe v. Barataria Land Co., fn. 4, supra; See also
Somers v. Schmidt, fn. 38, at page 420.
50 Grafton v. Hinkley, 111 Wis. 46 (1901); Seattle v. Northern P. R. Co., fn.
4734
48

35, supra.

51 Fn. 1, supra.
52 Fn. 1, supra.
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of what is required of him and of the consequences that will follow
neglect;53 that the indemnitor must be expressly notified by the indemnitee in order that he know the indemnitee intends to make him
liable,54 and that the notice must contain a request to appear and
55

defend.

In the Robbins case 56 the court merely stated that Robbins could
have defended the suit. The Wisconsin Court raises the question of
whether one not a party has an opportunity to defend without the
express request of the defendant. In Saveland v. Green,57 the court
in discussing the Robbins case, says that tfie defendant in an action
has an absolute right to control the defense thereto and no one not
a party can be permitted to interfere therewith without the consent
of the defendant. "It is absurd to say, therefore, that the mere fact
that one not a party but who may be liable over to the defendant had
notice of the pendency of the action, raises a presumption that he had
the right to defend it.

' '8
5

Among those cases holding that the notice must include a request
to appear and defend, there is conflict as to whether the indemnitee
must surrender control of the defense to the indemnitor, or whether
a mere request to assist in the defense is sufficient. In Consolidated
Hand Method Lasting Machine Co. v. Bradley,59 the following notice
was held insufficient as a tender of defense:
"In case, however, we should be beaten, we shall look to
you to recompense the machinery company; and we shall expect
you to assist in the conduct of the defense."
The court held that the notice given implied that the counsel of
the defendant-indemnitee intended to take control of the defense
of the suit, and that a voucher cannot insist upon retaining control of
the defense and yet hold the party notified bound by the result of the
suit. In Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. Ltd. v. Compania Transatlantica
Espanola,60 the statement, "we would be glad of your assistance in
obtaining testimony for the defense" was held an adequate tender.
The court stated that the indemnitee had been sued and had the right
to defend according to the judgment and advice of its own counsel;
and that it was not bound to abandon its interests to the care of a
stranger whose interests were not necessarily identical, but in some
cases were even hostile. The court concluded as follows:
3Hersey v. Long, fn. 36, supra; Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200 (1863).
54 Oskaloosa v. Pinkerton, 51 Iowa 697, 1 N.W. 689 (1879) ; See also Somers v.
Schmidt, fn. 38, supra.
55 Adams v. Filer, 7 Wis. 306 (1858), Saveland v. Green, fn. 38, supra.
56 Fn. 1. supra.
5 Fn. 38, supra.
58 Saveland v. Green, fn. 38, supra, at p. 625.
59 171 Mass. 125, 50 N.E 464, 68 Am. St. Rep. 409 (1898).
60

Fn. 15, stupra.
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"All that the defendant was entitled to was the opportunity
to defend, and to protect its own interests in the same way and
to the same extent as if it had been sued jointly with the plaintiff in the first instance; and this would not give to it any
right to manage or
control the proceedings, so far as concerned
its codefendant." 61
It has been held that in order that there be a valid tender, the
indemnitor must be notified of the pendency of an action, it being
insufficient that he be notified of an intention to sue ;62 and that a
notice to come in and assume the defense is insufficient where it
does not state the cause or nature of the action, or show in what way
the person notified may be interested.6
The Wisconsin Court has held that where a party seeks to bind
another by a judgment on the ground that a valid tender of defense
was made, he must in his pleadings allege that a tender of defense
64
was made and that such tender was timely.
CONFLICT OF LAws

With the amount of disparity there is in the decisions concerning
what constitutes an effective tender of defense, it is especially important to decide by what law the matter will be governed. An
attorney representing an indemnitor to whom a so-called tender of
defense is made is faced with the problem of deciding for his client
whether the tender is valid. Should he decide the matter on the
basig of the law of the court in which the action is pending, or
should he decide the problem on the basis of the law of the courts in
which the indemnitee may later seek to bind his client? On the other
hand, if an attorney represents an indemnitee who is being sued he
must decide which law shall govern in determining what procedure to
follow in making a tender.
The question must be considered with cognizance of the fact that
it has been held that an indemnitor can be vouched in to defend an
action in another state.6 - Although there is little or no authority
directly on this problem, it would seem that useful analogies might
be drawn from the authorities on the general problem of what law
governs the question of who are privies to an action. Where the
defense is tendered to a party over whom the court has no jurisdiction,
the effect of such tender is similar to the acquisition of jurisdiction.
6139 N.E. 360 at page 361. In accord, Restatement of Law of judgments, Sec.

107g; Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Sec. 449, Vol. 1, p. 985.
Dalton v. Bowken, 8 Nev. 190 (1873).
63 64 N.H. 8, 4 Atl. 392 (1886).
64 Saveland v. Green, fn. 38, supra.
65 Fn. 31, supra.
6

2
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In the case of Old Dominion Min. & S. Co. v. BigelouP6 it was ruled
that the underlying question of who are privies to a suit is that of
jurisdiction and should, therefore, be determined by the state in which
an adjudication is urged as an estoppel. The court stated as follows:
"The law of the state whose courts entered the judgment
does not control. Where it is not contended that one was a party,
it is equally an inquiry as to jurisdiction to determine whether he
was a privy to one who was a party. By parity of reasoning,
whether one is a privy to a judgment rendered in a sister or
foreign state must also be determined by the law of the sovereignty where the question arises. Privity was not a matter
in issue in the suit, judgment in which is pleaded, nor can it
be determined by an inspection of the judgment roll. It must
be decided by evidence outside the record. It is not to be settled
to the law of the state where the judgment is renaccording
67
dered."

Freeman on Judgments adopts the rule of the Bigelow case,
stating that the question of who are privies to a judgment is not one
which is adjudicated by the judgment itself, and as to a foreign
or sister state judgments should be determined in accordance with
the law of the state where the adjudication is urged as an estoppel.
Freeman states that the full faith and credit provision of the federal
constitution does not require that the law of the state rendering the
judgment should be followed on the question since it really goes to
the jurisdiction over the person.
The exception set forth by Freeman is that if the relation between
the parties is created by and depends upon the law of the state where
the judgment was rendered, and the nature of that relation, as fixed
by that law, determines whether one may be deemed the representative
of the other in litigation which may affect the latter's personal liability,
the conclusiveness of the judgment must in this respect be governed
by the law of the state where it was rendered. This raises a question
as to whether there is not some basis for a contention that the law
of the state governing the relationship between the parties should
govern the matter of what constitutes a valid tender.
In Wolfe v. BaratariaLand Co. 69 the court recognized a federal

rule on tender of defense holding that the rule of Robbins v. Chicago
City70 prevails in federal jurisdiction. In that case the plaintiff urged

as an estoppel the judgment of a court of Louisiana. There was no
discussion of the question of whether Louisiana law should govern
Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193, 40 L.R.A. (N.s.) 314 (1909), affirmed in 225 U.S.
111, 56 L.Ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641 (1912).
6740 L.R.A. (N.s.) 314, at page 344.
68 Fifth Edition, Sec. 1393, Vol. 3, p. 2876.
6 Fn. 4, supra.
7o Fn. 1, supra.
66302
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the determination of whether the tender of defense was valid, it
being held that the rule of Robbins v. Chicago City governed. This
case, if still good law, supports the theory that the law of the state
in which the adjudication is urged as an estoppel should prevail.
A different position is taken in the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws7 ' where the general rule concerning the effect of a
judgment is set forth as follows:
"The effect of a valid judgment upon the rights or other
interests of the parties and persons in privity with them is
determined by the law of the state where the judgment was
rendered."
In the comment on that rule it is stated that a judgment is valid
only as against parties who are subject to the jurisdiction of the
court which rendered the judgment and persons in privity with them;
that the law of the state where a valid judgment is rendered determines
who are in privity with the parties to the judgment, and that if by
the law of the state privity is imposed upon persons over whom the
72
state has no jurisdiction, the judgment is to that extent invalid.
Categorizing the problem as procedural or substantive would merely
state the conclusion rather than furnish a sound rational basis for
a ruling of first instance. If a federal court sitting in Wisconsin were
to consider the adequacy of a tender of defense of an action in a
Wisconsin court, the underlying policy of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine7 3 and subsequent developments of that doctrine 4 would dictate
that the Wisconsin rule of the Green case' 5 rather than the federal
rule of the Robbins case,76 govern. If the question arises in this
setting first, it is very apt to be labeled one of "substance". If this
much be conceded, it would follow that the federal court sitting in
Wisconsin would look to the Wisconsin rule of conflicts if the sufficiency of a tender made in connection with a suit in another state
77
were in issue.
The basic rationale of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine, that the
outcome of litigation should not depend upon the accident of diversity
of citizenship (or selection of forum) unless some more vital policy,
such as the necessity for a feasible court procedure, must prevail,
also furnishes a sane guide for determining first instance cases in
the field of conflicts. Therefore, in the situation last referred to above,
71

Sece 450 (1).

72 Sec. 450, Comment d.

- 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
7 See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 54, p. 979, United States Courts See. 356,

Sec. 358.
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Fn. 38, supra.

76 Fn. 1, supra.

77 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85 L.Ed. 1481 (1941).
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the federal court lacking a Wisconsin decision on the problem, or
the Wisconsin court facing the issue for the first time might carry
the substantive label a step further and look to the requirements
of the court in which the original judgment was rendered - this
unless the rule of the foreign jurisdiction contravened a strong Wisconsin policy by imposing upon its citizens an unreasonable hardship
such as being concluded by litigation of which they had inadequate
notice. This exception might be expressed in terms of jurisdiction, thus
amounting to a position similar to that taken on the question of privity
by the Restatement committee.78 It is submitted that this would fur9
nish a sounder pattern than the view adopted by Freeman."
An additional argument for adopting a conflicts rule which would
normally require following the tender of defense requisites of the
jurisdiction in which the first action is brought can be found in the
general agreement that if the vouchee "could have defended" he should
be bound.80 Whether or not he could have defended depends upon
the view of the court in which the original suit was tried, and the
view on this will correspond with that court's requirement for valid
tender of defense.
However, until the conflicts question is squarely decided in the
federal courts as well as relevant state courts, attorneys wishing to bind
indemnitors by tendering defense will be wise to be guided by the
requirements of jurisdictions asking for the most complete notice;
and conversely persons who might be held as indemnitors will be
obliged to consider cases like the Robbins case.

71 Fn. 71 and 72, supra.
79

Fn. 68, supra.

so Fn. 50, supra.

